SAFETY ACCIDENT REPORT

MARINE SAFETY INVESTIGATION AND REPORTING AUTHORITY
MSIRA

Report on the Grounding of SV Nohea Holokai, Anegada, Virgin Islands 6th July 2025

GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
Premier's Office

The main objective of a marine safety investigation is to prevent future accidents by identifying their causes and circumstances. It does not aim to determine liability or assign blame.

NOTE

This report is not written with litigation in mind, and pursuant to *Regulation 24 (10), Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2020* shall be inadmissible in any judicial proceedings whose purpose, or one of whose purposes, is to attribute or apportion liability or blame.

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Glossary of Abbreviations, Acronyms and Terms

Term	Definition
Abeam	Directly to the side of a vessel.
Aft	Toward the rear of a vessel.
Bareboat Charter	The hiring of a vessel without crew, where the charterer assumes responsibility for its operation.
Beam	The widest part of a vessel measured across its width.
Bow	The forward part of a vessel.
Bridge Deck	The structure connecting the hulls of a catamaran.
Catamaran	A vessel with two parallel hulls connected by a deck structure.
Challenge Day	A Sail Caribbean training exercise during which participants assume primary operational and navigational roles under supervision.
Chart Plotter	An electronic navigation device displaying charts, vessel position, route, and navigational information.
Commercial Use	The use of a vessel for hire, reward, or any activity involving payment.
Coral Head	An isolated coral formation that may present a navigational hazard.
Deck	The horizontal surface forms the upper structure of a vessel.
Grounding	An occurrence where a vessel unintentionally contacts the seabed, reef, rock, or other underwater

Term	Definition
	obstruction.
Helm	The position from which a vessel is steered.
Hull	The main watertight body of a vessel.
Lifejacket	A personal flotation device designed to keep a person afloat and assist in maintaining an airway clear of the water.
Lookout	A person assigned to maintain observation by sight and hearing to detect hazards and assess navigational risk.
Mate	A crew member assigned specific navigational or operational responsibilities.
Passage Plan	A plan detailing the intended route, hazards, navigational considerations, and operational requirements for a voyage.
Port	The left-hand side of a vessel when facing forward.
Reef Head	A shallow coral outcrop or formation.
Starboard	The right-hand side of a vessel when facing forward.
Stern	The rear end of a vessel.
Supervisory Captain	The individual assigned responsibility for oversight and intervention during Challenge Day operations.
Voyage Planning	The process of preparing and monitoring a safe route from departure to destination.

Abbreviation / Acronym	Full Term
AIS	Automatic Identification System
ASA	American Sailing Association
B&G	B&G Marine Electronics
BVI	British Virgin Islands
COLREGs	International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972
FRP	Fibreglass Reinforced Plastic
GPS	Global Positioning System
HIN	Hull Identification Number
IMO	International Maritime Organisation
MCA	Maritime and Coastguard Agency (United Kingdom)
MGN	Marine Guidance Note
MSIRA	Marine Safety Investigation and Reporting Authority
NM	Nautical Mile
PFD	Personal Flotation Device
RIB	Rigid Inflatable Boat
RYA	Royal Yachting Association
SCV Code	Code of Safety for Small Commercial Vessels Operating in the Caribbean (2017)
SMS	Safety Management System
SOLAS	International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
SV	Sailing Vessel
VHF	Very High Frequency
VISMA	Virgin Islands Shipping and Maritime Authority

Figures

Synopsis

On 6th July 2025, at approximately 8:00 a.m., the sailing vessel Nohea Holokai, a 46-foot Lagoon Catamaran, struck a submerged rock in the coral head field area outside the Anegada channel. The vessel was part of a fleet participating in Sail Caribbean's Summer Camp Charter.

On the day of the incident, known as "Challenge Day," the vessel was operated by several students under the supervision of the assigned captain and crew, with a total of 14 people on board: 4 staff members (including the captain, crew, and social media manager) and 10 students. During the trip, the vessel's chart plotter displayed only limited mapping information and did not provide the detailed chart information required to identify surrounding coral heads and other navigational hazards. Although the issue was previously reported, it remained unresolved at the time of the incident.

As the vessel navigated out of the Anegada Channel, the SV Nohea Holokai turned to port into the wind and began raising the mainsail. The students and crew on board focused primarily on hoisting the sails while the vessel continued toward the field of coral heads. The crew focused on raising the mainsail and did not implement any adjustments during that time. Shortly after entering the shallow area of the coral field, the vessel struck a submerged rock on its starboard side, causing it to rapidly take on water and become partially submerged.

The captain and crew members quickly gathered all the students and radioed for the staff boat. The staff boat arrived shortly after being radioed and successfully rescued everyone from the sinking vessel.

The Marine Safety Investigation and Reporting Authority (MSIRA) conducted a thorough investigation into the grounding to examine all factors that contributed to its occurrence. The investigation identified several contributing factors, including:

- Limited onboard experience relevant to the vessel's size, complexity, and operating area
- Reduced situational awareness by the vessel's operator
- Lack of an assigned lookout, and
- Limited information displayed on chart plotter

Vessel Overview

Figure 1 SV Nohea Holokai

The SV Nohea Holokai is a 2020 model Lagoon 46 sailing catamaran operating in the British Virgin Islands (BVI). The vessel measures approximately 13.99 meters (46 feet) in length and has a beam of about eight meters. It is designed for bareboat and commercial charter services.

The SV Nohea Holokai holds a Small Commercial Vessel Certificate, which permits a maximum of ten individuals onboard. This total includes the captain, crew, staff, and participants, meaning that the limit of ten is not in addition to the crew. Evidence shows that fourteen people were onboard at the time of the incident, consisting of three vessel staff members, one additional staff member, and ten students. Without a separate exemption or endorsement, the vessel was operating with four people above its certified limit. The certificate was issued primarily under the Code of Practice for Small Commercial Sailing Vessels. It also references MGN 280(M), Annex 8, specifically concerning handover procedures when the vessel is operated as a bareboat charter or hired for pleasure.

The vessel was equipped with twin diesel engines, a single steering position, a GPS chart plotter, VHF communications equipment, and safety appliances associated with bareboat and commercial charter operations. At the time of the grounding, it was managed by Navigare Yachting and was frequently used for bareboat charter activities throughout the Virgin Islands.

Factual Information

Section	Details
Vessel name	Nohea Holokai
Flag	Canada
Hull Identification Number (HIN)	IRIZV047J920
Registration Number	845047
Vessel Type	Sail & Motor Twin Screw Catamaran
Make and model	Lagoon 46
Length Overall	46 feet
Propulsion	Twin 4-cylinder internal combustion Yanmar 57HP marine diesel engine
Construction	Fibreglass Reinforced Plastic (FRP)
Crew on board	3
Passengers on board	11
Port of departure	Nanny Cay
Type of voyage	Bareboat Charter
Purpose of voyage	Instructional Charter
Time of incident	Approximately 8:00 a.m. (local time)
Date of incident	6th July, 2025
Type of incident	Grounding
Location of incident	Anegada
Injuries/fatalities	No injuries

Narrative

Sail Caribbean Summer Camp

Sail Caribbean is a youth summer programme operating primarily within the British Virgin Islands, where participants live aboard sailing vessels while undertaking training in seamanship, marine awareness, diving, and water-based activities. The programme integrates practical sailing experience with elements of marine education, safety training, and teamwork, providing young people with exposure to the maritime environment.

The programme is a paid initiative that includes a two- to three-week instructional course aboard a catamaran, where students learn to sail. Sail Caribbean employs a diverse range of staff, including former students who have completed the LIMA program. This program offers various courses, such as ASA Instructor certification, RYA Powerboat Level 2, and Dive Master training. Upon completion of these courses, graduates are qualified to work as staff and independently captain catamarans with groups of children on board. However, the captain assigned to SV Nohea Holokai did not complete the entire LIMA program before taking on the role of captain.

On 27th May 2025, Sail Caribbean began preparations for its summer camp. From 27th May to 17th June 2025, former summer camp attendees, chosen to serve as staff members, underwent a series of training sessions to prepare for their roles as crew aboard different vessels upon the start of the instructional charters. Among the selected candidates, a 19-year-old female was appointed captain of the SV Nohea Holokai for a three-week period starting on 21st June 2025. She had been attending the camp since she was 15 years old, beginning in 2022, before her appointment as captain in 2025. As the newly appointed captain, she managed a crew of ten children aged 10 to 18, along with two other female crew members, aboard the 46-foot catamaran.

Pre-Incident

On 5th July 2025, the Sail Caribbean fleet arrived at Anegada as part of its annual summer sailing program. During the evening, specific students aboard the SV Nohea Holokai were selected to participate in the following day's "Challenge Day" exercise and attended a briefing on the staff vessel. During this briefing, students, all aged thirteen, were assigned the roles of skipper, navigator, and mate for the exercise, and they received instructions on their responsibilities for the next day.

As part of the Challenge Day format, the “Challenge Day Skipper and Crew” were expected to independently operate and navigate their assigned vessels while applying the seamanship, navigation, and sailing skills acquired throughout the programme, while the other students assisted with secondary tasks onboard the vessel. To encourage independent decision-making, participants were limited to asking only three questions during the exercise. The intended route and voyage plan were reviewed with the students using an electronic chart aboard the staff vessel, and they were provided with a point-of-sail reference guide to assist with sail handling and navigation.

The captain and crew members assigned to SV Nohea Holokai were instructed to intervene only if they deemed the operation unsafe.

Prior to departure on the morning of 6th July 2025, concerns had been raised regarding the functionality of the chart plotter aboard SV Nohea Holokai. The equipment did not display detailed navigational information; however, the issue remained unresolved before the exercise commenced. Despite this deficiency, the vessel participated in Challenge Day under the control of its assigned captain and crew.

At approximately 8:00 a.m., the Challenge Day exercise began as the fleet departed Anegada Channel and transited outward. Control of the SV Nohea Holokai was transferred to the students, who assumed the roles of skipper, navigator, and mate, while the vessel's captain and crew remained on board in a supervisory capacity. The fleet proceeded in order through the channel toward the designated sailing area outside the reef system.

Grounding



Figure 2: Navionics showing the Anegada channel and area of impact

At approximately 8:00 a.m., the fleet began to transit out of the Anegada Channel. At that time, SV Nohea Holokai was fully operated by the “Challenge Day” skipper and crew, which included three children aged thirteen. The other seven students on board assisted with various tasks, specifically raising the mainsail. The 13-year-old female skipper of the Challenge Day maintained control of the vessel under both engine power and sail. However, she indicated that she was heavily focused on the other students raising the mainsail and lacked attention to navigation. The captain of the vessel, a 19-year-old female, remained seated beside her during the transit out of the channel.

While navigating the Anegada Channel at an estimated speed of between 0 and 6 knots, SV Nohea Holokai had two vessels ahead and one vessel behind. The captain later expressed her discomfort with leading the transit through the channel. As a result, she instructed the challenge day skipper to follow the vessels ahead to exit the channel safely.

During the transit, SV Nohea Holokai overtook one of the vessels ahead on its starboard side, becoming the second vessel in the fleet to exit the channel. Following the overtaking manoeuvre, the captain intervened and reduced the vessel's speed after becoming concerned that the operation was becoming unsafe.

After exiting the channel, SV *Nohea Holokai* turned to port and headed into the wind and commenced raising the mainsail. As the crew's attention remained focused on hoisting the sails, the vessel held course and departed the safer navigable track. The vessel subsequently entered the coral head field located at the port side of the channel and struck a submerged rock within the coral head field.

Following the grounding, the captain assumed control of the helm and attempted to manoeuvre SV Nohea Holokai off the reef. After several attempts, she managed to free the vessel and proceeded a short distance into deeper water. Shortly thereafter, a concerned male student proceeded below deck and observed water entering the vessel at a rapid rate. He immediately alerted the supervising crew.

After being alerted, the captain went below deck and confirmed that the vessel was flooding at a significant rate. She, along with her crew, instructed all people on board to come to the deck; all persons on board, except the social media manager, had life jackets. A distress call was then made via VHF radio to the staff vessel requesting immediate assistance. Recognising the seriousness of the situation, she returned to the deck and continued preparations for the possible abandonment of the vessel while maintaining communication with the staff vessel.

Shortly after being radioed, the senior staff arrived on board a RIB and commenced the evacuation of all people from SV Nohea Holokai, while other vessels participating in the exercise also assisted. All children and crew members were successfully evacuated before the flooding reached a critical stage.

Despite efforts to manage the situation, water ingress continued unabated, and SV Nohea Holokai became partially submerged. All people on board were safely rescued and accounted for, and no injuries were reported. The vessel was later located and recovered by a commercial salvage company.

Salvage and Recovery

Figure 3: SV Nohea Holokai partially submerged

Following the evacuation of all persons on board, SV Nohea Holokai continued taking on water and subsequently became partially submerged and adrift south of Anegada. Husky Salvage and Towing responded with specialised salvage vessels and crew. Upon arrival on scene, the vessel was observed submerged by the stern and listing to starboard, with only the bow and sections of the bridge deck remaining above water.

Figure 4: Husky Salvage floating the submerged vessel

Salvage personnel prioritised stabilising the vessel to prevent further sinking or rollover. Marine salvage airbags were deployed beneath the bridge deck and inflated to raise and support the stern section, while the vessel's anchor was deployed to maintain position. During the operation, responders identified a three-inch hole in the starboard hull forward of the keel, which was temporarily plugged to reduce further water ingress.

Figure 5: Dewatering and Lifting Process

Additional lift bags and dewatering pumps were subsequently used to progressively remove water from the vessel's interior spaces. During dewatering operations, smoke was observed within the saloon area, believed to have resulted from seawater encountering live electrical systems.

Once the vessel had been sufficiently stabilised and dewatered, SV Nohea Holokai was taken under tow to Nanny Cay Marina, where it was successfully hauled out for further examination and assessment.

Damage to the vessel

Figure 6: Single puncture observed on the starboard hull

SV Nohea Holokai was inspected at Nanny Cay Boat Yard after its recovery. During the inspection, a single puncture, measuring three inches in diameter, was found on the starboard hull below the waterline in the forward section of the vessel. Additionally, minor scraping and grazing were observed along the hull. However, the scraping was significantly less than what is typically observed with conventional grounding. The puncture indicates that there was brief, isolated contact with a rock or coral reef head.

Figure 7: Light grazing observed along hull

Weather Conditions

At the time of the incident, weather conditions across Anegada were reported as fair. Winds were light to moderate from the east, averaging between 10 and 15 knots. Sea conditions were moderate, with wave heights not exceeding two meters. Visibility was good throughout the day, estimated at over ten nautical miles.

Vessel Operation

Captain and Crew

The vessel's captain was 19 years old and had participated in Sail Caribbean summer camps between 2022 and 2024 before completing staff training in 2025. Prior to her appointment as captain of SV Nohea Holokai on 21st June 2025, she had not independently commanded a vessel of comparable size and complexity. Her experience navigating in Virgin Islands waters had primarily been gained through Sail Caribbean activities, and she had no documented experience independently commanding a vessel in a commercial or instructional operation.

The vessel's crew included two additional staff members, aged between 19 and 25, whose sailing and navigational experience had also been developed through Sail Caribbean summer camps and internal staff training. Sail Caribbean's internal assessment process had determined that they were sufficiently competent to serve as crew members aboard SV Nohea Holokai.

During the summer camp period, the captain raised concerns about her readiness to manage and operate SV

Nohea Holokai. She nevertheless continued in the assigned role under the operational and supervisory arrangements established by Sail Caribbean. These concerns indicated that additional vessel-specific familiarisation, experience, or onboard support may have been appropriate before assigning independent command responsibilities.

On the morning of the occurrence, the supervising captain reported being uncomfortable leading the fleet through the Anegada Channel. The vessel was consequently navigated by visually following vessels ahead rather than by independently monitoring its position against the intended route. This increased reliance on the movements of other vessels coincided with sail-raising activities near the coral-head field and reduced the effectiveness of the navigational oversight available onboard.

The captain held American Sailing Association certifications 103 and 104 and an RYA Powerboat Level 2 certificate. The command-selection process did not take into full account her limited experience in independently operating a similar vessel in the relevant area, nor did it consider the extra supervisory requirements associated with Challenge Day. These factors highlight the necessity of aligning command appointments, vessel-specific familiarisation, and onboard supervision with the vessel's size, operating area, and intended activities.

Challenge Day Skipper

The “Challenge Day” skipper was a 13-year-old student with no prior experience independently operating a vessel of SV Nohea Holokai's size. At the time of the incident, she held no certifications. Her previous sailing experience was limited to operating small tiller-operated sloops during camp activities and training exercises.

Certifying framework and applicable safety standards

At the time of the occurrence, SV Nohea Holokai held a Small Commercial Vessel License and Certificate issued under the authority of the Virgin Islands Shipping and Maritime Authority. The certificate stated that the vessel had been examined in accordance with the Code of Practice for the Construction, Machinery, Equipment, Stability, Operation and Examination of Sailing Vessels of up to twenty-four metres Load Line length, in commercial use and carrying no more than 12 passengers.

The certificate identified the Code of Practice applicable to small commercial sailing vessels as the standard under which the vessel had been examined. It also referred to Annex 8 of MGN 280(M) in relation to handover and familiarisation procedures for bareboat charter or hire as a pleasure vessel. However, the certificate did not explain how these references related to the Code of Safety for Small Commercial Vessels (SCV Code 2017) or specify which standard governed the vessel’s manning arrangements. Accordingly, the investigation was unable to determine from the certificate alone whether the supervising captain’s qualifications were to be assessed under the manning provisions of the certifying Code or MGN 280, and clarification was not obtained from the certifying authority.

Although the vessel had been supplied through a bareboat-charter arrangement, it was being used by Sail Caribbean as part of a fee-paying instructional programme, with a captain and crew appointed by the programme operator. The activity therefore had the characteristics of a commercial sail-training operation and should not automatically be treated as a bareboat charter use for the purpose of determining the applicable manning arrangements.

The supervising captain held American Sailing Association certifications 103 and 104 and an RYA Powerboat Level 2 certificate. These qualifications demonstrated training in sailing and powerboat handling but did not correspond directly with the sailing qualification identified by the certifying code outlined.

The certificate also specified a maximum of ten people on board. This was a vessel-specific limit applying to the total number of people carried, including the captain, crew, staff, and participants, rather than a limit of ten passengers in addition to crew. Fourteen people were on board at the time of the occurrence: the captain and two crew members, one additional staff member who was a social media manager and ten students. In the absence of a separate exemption or amended endorsement, the vessel therefore appears to have been operating with four people above the maximum stated on its certificate.

The uncertainty regarding recognised command qualifications, the level of relevant command experience and the number of people on board reduced assurance that the vessel's operational and supervisory arrangements were consistent with the safety conditions contemplated by its certificate.

Voyage Planning

The intended route for "Challenge Day" was shown to both the supervising captain and the Challenge Day skipper, along with the participating crew, prior to departure. The route was displayed to them on an electronic chart aboard the staff vessel, and the Challenge Day crew were expected to utilise the voyage plan, together with previously taught navigational skills, to safely navigate the vessel during the exercise.

The investigation raised concerns about the functionality and effectiveness of the voyage plan aboard the SV Nohea Holokai. At the time of the incident, the chart plotter used by the operators on the SV Nohea Holokai did not display navigational information correctly. Reports indicated that the display showed limited or no chart details, including the absence of an identifiable coral reef head field surrounding the Anegada Channel in the navigation area. Despite these significant deficiencies, the issue was left unresolved before departure.

Analysis

Aim

The purpose of the analysis is to assess the contributory factors and circumstances of the accident, which will then be used to make recommendations to prevent similar accidents from occurring in the future.

The Accident

The investigation determined that the grounding occurred following a loss of continuous positional awareness during a critical stage of the vessel's transit from the Anegada Channel. Although SV Nohea Holokai was operating as part of a five-vessel fleet, the movement of the vessels ahead became the principal navigational reference. This reduced the extent to which the vessel's own position and track were independently monitored in relation to the nearby coral head field.

Shortly after leaving the channel, sail-raising operations commenced while the vessel was still navigating near the coral head field. This increased the workload on the supervising captain and crew and divided their attention between sail handling and navigation. No crew member was assigned exclusively to lookout duties. Although fourteen people were on board, the operational arrangement did not clearly allocate responsibility for monitoring the vessel's track or the coral heads on the port side. Consequently, the vessel's movement towards the coral field was not identified early enough for effective avoiding action to be taken.

The chart plotter displayed only basic mapping and did not show the detailed chart information needed to identify the surrounding reefs. The detailed chart display was subsequently restored during the post-occurrence examination after the chart card was inserted into an alternative card slot. The limited display reduced the crew's ability to independently verify the vessel's position electronically. In these circumstances, safe navigation depended more heavily on other measures, including visual monitoring, alternative position checks, appropriate speed management, and the prioritisation of navigational duties. These compensating measures were not sufficiently established before sail-raising operations commenced.

The environmental conditions were favourable and were not considered contributory. Visibility was good, with winds from the east to east-southeast at 10–15 knots, and no significant precipitation was reported. The grounding therefore resulted from the combined effects of reduced positional monitoring, divided attention, the absence of a specifically assigned lookout and the limited navigational information available from the chart plotter, rather than from any single action or environmental condition.

The Chart-plotter



Figure 8: SV Nohea Holokai Chart Plotter display observed following the grounding

SV Nohea Holokai was fitted with a B&G electronic chart plotter. Evidence obtained during the investigation indicated that, at the time of the occurrence, the unit was not displaying the detailed chart information necessary for safe navigation through the area. As a result, the students and crew were deprived of an important navigational aid that would ordinarily have highlighted the coral head field located to port of the vessel's intended route.

Figure 9: SV Nohea Holokai Chart Plotter after post-occurrence inspection



Subsequent examination of the chart plotter confirmed that the display was initially limited to basic mapping information. However, after the chart card was removed and inserted into an alternative card slot, the system reset and detailed chart data, including tracks, coral heads, depth contours, and channel information, became visible. This suggests that the unit was affected by a chart card or system-related fault during the voyage. Regardless of the underlying technical cause, the chart plotter did not provide the level of navigational information the crew needed during a critical phase of the passage.

Lookout and Situational Awareness

The investigation revealed that no dedicated lookout was assigned at the time of the grounding, even though there were fourteen people on board. Instead, the captain, crew, challenge day skipper, navigator, and mate, along with other students, were all focused on sail-raising operations.

While the chart plotter was not displaying the detailed navigational information necessary for safe navigation, the investigation considered that the equipment malfunction alone did not make the grounding inevitable. Good visibility, favourable weather conditions, and the number of people on board provided multiple opportunities to identify surrounding hazards through alternative means, including visual navigation, effective lookout procedures, and independent monitoring of passage.

Supervisory Oversight and Challenge Day Operations

The investigation found that Sail Caribbean had an established safety management framework covering vessel operations, emergency response, and other onboard activities. However, the arrangements for Challenge Day aboard SV Nohea Holokai did not clearly establish the level of onboard experience required, the allocation of navigational responsibilities or the circumstances in which supervising staff were expected to intervene as an unsafe situation developed.

During Challenge Day, the students conducted the primary vessel-handling and navigational tasks. The captain retained overall command and responsibility for the vessel's safety but was expected to remain in a supervisory role, intervening only when she considered the operation unsafe. During Challenge Day, three students, all aged 13 years, were assigned duties as skipper, navigator, and mate, while other students assisted with various tasks. The experienced senior staff remained aboard a separate support vessel called the "Staff Vessel". This arrangement relied heavily on SV Nohea Holokai's onboard team to identify developing risks and initiate appropriate action, while personnel on the support vessel had limited ability to continuously monitor the vessel's position, navigational decisions, and onboard activities.

Radio support from the staff vessel remained available and assisted with the response following the grounding. However, remote support could not provide the same level of continuous situational awareness and immediate intervention as experienced onboard supervision. The underlying safety issue therefore concerned the design of the supervisory arrangement, including the distribution of experience, allocation of navigational duties and absence of clearly defined intervention thresholds during participant-led operations.

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Conclusion

Safety Issues Directly Contributing to the Accident

1. The command and supervisory arrangements did not fully account for the supervising captain's limited independent experience with vessels of comparable size and complexity or with navigation in the waters surrounding Anegada. Her expressed uncertainty was not sufficiently supported by additional experienced onboard oversight, contributing to increased reliance on vessels ahead and reduced independent monitoring of the vessel's position, intended route and surrounding navigational hazards.

2. No dedicated lookout was posted despite there being fourteen people on board. Consequently, no individual(s) was specifically tasked with monitoring the vessel's proximity to the surrounding coral heads during sail-raising operations, thereby reducing the crew's ability to identify and respond to the developing danger.

3. The attention of the supervising captain, crew and participants became heavily focused on sail-raising activities immediately after exiting the Anegada Channel. This reduced situational awareness and diverted attention from monitoring the vessel's position during a critical phase of the passage.

4. The vessel's chart plotter was not displaying detailed navigational information, including charted coral heads and surrounding hazards. This deprived the crew of important navigational aid and reduced their ability to maintain positional awareness while operating near the reef system.

Safety Issues Indirectly Contributing to the Accident

1. The Challenge Day supervisory model distributed operational responsibilities and experienced oversight between the participating vessels and a separate support vessel. Aboard SV Nohea Holokai, this arrangement meant that additional navigational and technical experience was available remotely rather than immediately on board, limiting continuous oversight and the opportunity for timely intervention as navigational risk developed.

2. Concerns regarding the functionality of the vessel's chart plotter had been identified prior to departure. However, the deficiency remained unresolved before the vessel commenced the exercise, resulting in its operation without access to reliable electronic navigational information.

Other Safety Issues

1. The investigation revealed concerns about the certification and operational arrangements for SV Nohea Holokai. The vessel's certificate referenced multiple safety standards but lacked clarity on manning and command-qualification requirements for its use in fee-paying instruction. Additionally, fourteen people were on board, exceeding the maximum of ten specified in the certificate, with no evidence of an exemption or amended endorsement. While these issues did not directly cause the grounding, they undermined confidence in the vessel's compliance with its certification conditions.

Recommendations

1. Sail Caribbean should review the risk assessment and safety management arrangements applicable to Challenge Day activities to ensure that hazards associated with participant-led navigation, reduced supervision, equipment failures, and operations near navigational hazards are appropriately identified and controlled.

2. Sail Caribbean should review its procedures for assessing, appointing, and supporting personnel assigned command and supervisory responsibilities aboard vessels used during its summer sailing programme to ensure they possess the competence, confidence, and experience necessary for the areas of operation and activities being undertaken.

3. Sail Caribbean should review its navigational risk management procedures to ensure that defects affecting navigational equipment are identified, assessed, and appropriately addressed before vessels are permitted to participate in operational activities where such equipment may be required for safe navigation.

Recommendations (continued)

4. Sail Caribbean should review its operational procedures to ensure that an effective lookout is always maintained during vessel operations and that sail-handling, training, or instructional activities do not adversely affect the monitoring of navigational hazards.