SAFETY ACCIDENT REPORT

Marine Safety Investigation Report on the Grounding of MV Calypso Great Camanoe, Virgin Islands 30th June 2026



GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
Premier's Office

The main objective of a marine safety investigation is to prevent future accidents by identifying their causes and circumstances. It does not aim to determine liability or assign blame.

NOTE

This report is not written with litigation in mind, and pursuant to *Regulation 24(10), Merchant Shipping (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2020* shall be inadmissible in any judicial proceedings whose purpose, or one of whose purposes, is to attribute or apportion liability or blame.

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Contents

Summary 4
Motor Vessel Calypso 5
Narrative 7
Virgin Charter Yachts 7
Pre-departure checks and documentation 7
Charter 7
The Grounding 8
Environmental Conditions 9
Post-Grounding 9
Engine and Propulsion Issues 10
Communication and Technical Support (VCY and Captain) 10
Damage to Vessel 11
Other Safety Issues 14
Manning requirements 14
MGN 280 Code 15
Bareboat Charter Manning Exemption 15
Commercial Use of a Bareboat Charter 15
Analysis 16
Aim 16
Overview 16
Reported Loss of Engine Power and Propulsion 16
Human Factors and Situational Awareness 17
Anchoring 17
Post Grounding Response 17
Technical Support 18
Conclusion 18
Recommendations 19

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Summary

On 27th June 2026, Motor Vessel Calypso, a 44-foot Fountaine Pajot MY6, departed Nanny Cay on a scheduled nine-day skippered charter with a captain and five guests aboard. The captain held a Boatmaster Grade 2 licence issued by the Virgin Islands Shipping and Maritime Authority. The captain also had experience operating similar vessels with Virgin Charter Yachts (VCY).

During the charter on 28th and 29th June, the captain experienced difficulties starting the port engine. On both occasions, he contacted Virgin Charter Yachts (VCY) and, after following remote troubleshooting instructions, successfully restarted the engine.

On 30th June, after departing Trellis Bay for Scrub Island, the vessel lost propulsion at approximately 9:32 a.m. while navigating between Marina Cay and Great Camanoe. After losing propulsion, the vessel drifted for about 18 minutes before grounding. During this time, the captain focused primarily on restoring power to the port engine. The investigation did not establish whether the reported power loss affected one engine or both.

MV Calypso grounded on the rocky shoreline of Great Camanoe at approximately 9:50 a.m., sustaining substantial hull and propeller damage. No injuries were reported, and a nearby operator transferred the five guests to safety at approximately 10:09 a.m.

The Marine Safety Investigation and Reporting Authority (MSIRA) investigated the circumstances and contributing factors of the grounding, including the earlier port engine starting difficulties, the reported loss of propulsion, and the response before and after the grounding. The investigation also examined the emergency measures taken to protect those aboard and identified safety issues to help prevent similar occurrences.


The investigation identified several safety issues.

- During the 18-minute drift, efforts focused on recovering the machinery rather than deploying the anchor manually or managing passenger safety, reducing awareness of the approaching shoreline hazard.
- The vessel operated without the additional deck rating required by its Small Commercial Vessel Certificate, increasing the captain’s workload and reducing access to trained assistance during the emergency.
- The recurring port-engine starting difficulty was resolved remotely without an onboard technical assessment before the vessel’s next departure.

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Motor Vessel Calypso

MV *Calypso* is a 44-ft Fountaine Pajot MY6 fitted with two independent Volvo Penta D6-IPS650 diesel engines, each driving a dedicated Volvo Penta Inboard Performance System (IPS) propulsion unit. The twin-engine configuration provides independent propulsion and multi-directional steering through each pod, allowing the vessel to manoeuvre using either engine individually or both simultaneously under normal operating conditions. The independent arrangement also provides redundancy, enabling the vessel to retain limited propulsion and manoeuvrability if one engine or propulsion unit fails or shuts down, depending on the nature of the malfunction. The vessel has dual steering positions in the saloon and on the flybridge. MV *Calypso* is equipped with a Volvo Penta e-Key system that requires three stages for normal engine starting: EVC system authorisation, ignition activation and engine starting. If any stage is incomplete, the affected engine may not start.



Vessel Information

Section	Details
Vessel name	Calypso
Flag	United States
Hull Identification	DFP29066G121
Registration Number	1317864
Vessel Type	Motor Twin Screw Catamaran
Make and model	Fountaine Pajot MY6
Build Year	2021
Operator/Manager	Virgin Charter Yachts
Length Overall	44 feet
Maximum no. of persons	12
Deck rating	1
Propulsion	Twin Volvo Penta D6-IPS650 diesel engines
Construction	Fibreglass Reinforced Plastic (FRP)
Crew on board	1 (Captain)
Passengers on board	5
Place of departure	Nanny Cay
Type of voyage	Commercial Skippered Charter
Purpose of voyage	Leisure
Time of incident	Approximately 9:50 a.m. (local time)
Date of incident	30th June, 2026
Type of incident	Grounding
Location of incident	Great Camanoe
Injuries/fatalities	No injuries

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Narrative

Virgin Charter Yachts

Virgin Charter Yachts (VCY) is a yacht charter company based at Nanny Cay Marina, Tortola. The company offers bareboat charters consisting exclusively of Power Catamarans. They also manage fully crewed yachts, including sailing and motor yachts.

MV Calypso was part of VCY's charter fleet before the grounding. Previous records noted minor defects, including air-conditioning issues, but reported no engine or propulsion faults. Immediately before the charter commenced on 27th June 2026, the vessel completed a six-day charter without any reported engine or propulsion difficulties. VCY also completed documented pre-departure inspections and checks before assigning the vessel to the charter on 27th June 2026.

Pre-departure checks and documentation

Before MV Calypso departed for charter, VCY completed a documented inspection and handover. The handover process included checks of the engines, underwater hull, and propulsion components, along with a general walkthrough and briefing on the vessel. The captain signed the inspection record, confirming that the items examined were in satisfactory condition.

The captain also stated that he independently inspected the engines, including their oil and coolant levels, and found them in good working condition. He also signed the Hazard Chart Agreement, acknowledging the navigational hazards in the intended operating areas, and completed the vessel inventory and pre-departure checklist.


Charter

The charter began at Nanny Cay on 27th June 2026, with planned stops at Cooper Island, The Indians, Peter Island, Trellis Bay, and Anegada. The vessel's first stop was Norman Island, where it moored overnight. On the morning of 28th June 2026, after visiting the caves at Norman Island, the captain had trouble starting the port engine. He contacted Virgin Charter Yachts (VCY), followed its instructions, and started the engine successfully. Because of the starting issue, the planned stop at The Indians was cancelled, and the vessel proceeded directly to Peter Island, arriving at noon. The guests went ashore for lunch while the captain remained aboard. The vessel stayed docked overnight.

On the morning of 29th June 2026, the captain again had trouble starting the port engine while preparing to depart Peter Island. After contacting VCY and successfully restarting the engine using the instructions provided, he continued to Trellis Bay, where the vessel moored overnight.

The following day, 30th June 2026, MV *Calypso* departed Trellis Bay for Scrub Island. While navigating between Marina Cay and Great Camanoe, the vessel lost propulsion and subsequently grounded on Great Camanoe's rocky shoreline.

The Grounding



On the morning of 30th June, at approximately 9:00 a.m., the captain started both engines at Trellis Bay without difficulty and let them idle for about 10 minutes before departing for Scrub Island. At approximately 9:32 a.m., while navigating between Marina Cay and Great Camanoe, the captain reported an engine-related loss of propulsion.

During the ensuing drift, the captain focused on restarting the port engine and contacting VCY; the guests recommended dropping anchor to stop the vessel's movement toward the shoreline and repeatedly warned the captain about the proximity of the rocks. The captain immediately returned to the flybridge and tried to deploy the anchor using the powered windlass, but the reported loss of electrical power prevented it from operating. He did not attempt to deploy the anchor manually. During the investigation, a secondary, fully rigged anchor was found directly adjacent to the vessel's rigged anchor, which had been available prior to the grounding.



MV Calypso grounded on the rocky shoreline of Great Camanoe at approximately 9:50 a.m., about 18 minutes after the reported loss of propulsion. The vessel sustained hull damage; however, no injuries were reported.

Environmental Conditions

At the time of the occurrence, the wind was from the east-southeast at 8 to 15 mph (13 to 24 km/h). Wave heights in open water were estimated at 3 to 5 feet (0.9 to 1.5 meters), representing slight to moderate sea conditions.

The environmental conditions were not identified as contributing to the reported loss of propulsion; however, the open-water sea conditions affected the vessel after it grounded and during the subsequent attempts to remove it from the rocky shoreline.

Post-Grounding



MV Calypso grounded on Great Camanoe

Following the grounding, the captain focused on freeing the vessel from the rocks. The guests began taking their own lifesaving measures, finding and donning lifejackets. At the captain's request, one adult guest helped lower the stern tender platform so the tender could be launched. The captain then tried to pull MV Calypso away from the rocks using the tender, but the effort failed.

The captain then sought assistance from several passing boaters, who secured lines between their vessels and MV *Calypso* and attempted to pull it from the rocks. During these unsuccessful attempts, the five guests, comprising three children and two adults, remained aboard in the aft cockpit. MV *Calypso*'s tender capsized near the stern and was damaged during the recovery efforts.

At approximately 10:09 a.m., after several unsuccessful attempts to free the vessel from the rocks, a nearby operator volunteered to transport the guests from MV Calypso to safety by dinghy. The captain remained aboard and continued efforts to free the vessel, which failed again. VCY subsequently contacted Husky Salvage & Towing, which attended the scene and safely freed the vessel from the rocks.

Engine and Propulsion Issues

On 28th June, the captain reported the first issue with the port engine, which would not start after he switched off the engine battery power overnight using the battery isolation switches. The following morning, he restored battery power, and both displays showed 13.0 V and 14.2 V; however, the port engine still did not start. He then sought advice from Virgin Charter Yachts (VCY) and power-cycled the system using the key fob, ignition system, and engine battery switches. Both engines then started and operated normally.

On 29th June, the captain reported another difficulty starting the port engine while at Peter Island, this was the second occurrence. The captain contacted VCY again and, after following the technicians' restart instructions, the engine started and operated normally.

On the morning of 30th June, the captain started both engines, which started normally, and idled for about 10 minutes before departure. Shortly after the vessel got underway, the captain reported that both engines stopped, resulting in a loss of propulsion. The captain attempted to restart the engines; however, the available evidence did not establish that usable propulsion or sufficient manoeuvring control was restored before the grounding.

The investigation did not obtain sufficient diagnostic information post-occurrence to determine the technical cause of the reported engine stoppage and loss of propulsion. The evidence also did not establish a direct causal link between the earlier port engine starting difficulties and the subsequent loss of propulsion. Accordingly, the cause of the loss of propulsion could not be determined.

Communication and Technical Support (VCY and Captain)

At the beginning of the charter on 27th June, Virgin Charter Yachts established a dedicated WhatsApp group for MV Calypso. The captain was advised to use the group chat to request any assistance during the charter.

On 28th June, at approximately 11:23 a.m., the captain reported through WhatsApp that he was receiving a low-

voltage indication and that the port engine would not start. The captain stated that the battery had been switched off overnight and was switched on the morning of 28th June prior to departure. At 11:24 a.m., he shared an image showing voltage readings of 13.0 V and 14.2 V but reported that the engine still would not start. At 11:32 a.m., a VCY representative instructed him to use the key fob to switch off both ignition systems, switch off both battery switches for several minutes, restore battery power, reactivate the ignition systems with the key fob, and restart the engines. The captain acknowledged the instructions at 11:41 a.m. and subsequently reported that the procedure had restored normal engine operation.

On 29th June, the captain reported via WhatsApp that the vessel's water maker was not working. VCY advised that a technician would contact him when available. At 11:53 a.m., a technician contacted the captain, and they resolved the issue. Later that day, the captain had trouble starting the port engine again and contacted VCY. The issue was resolved using the same instructions as the day before, and the port engine started and ran normally for the rest of the day.

At 7:51 a.m., a passenger reported that a black rope at the stern appeared to be caught in a propeller. The captain acknowledged the report, and it was subsequently confirmed that the rope was clear of the propeller. The vessel remained secured to a mooring in Trellis Bay until departure.


At 9:32 a.m., while underway, the captain reported engine failure. A VCY representative acknowledged the captain's report and advised that a technician had been contacted and would call him. At 9:47 a.m., the technician told the captain that personnel were being arranged to depart and attend the vessel at Trellis Bay.

At 9:59 a.m., the captain reported an emergency via WhatsApp stating that the vessel was on the rocks. VCY then arranged for Husky Salvage to respond. The captain was asked to confirm that all guests were safe and advised that they were. The captain stated that he attempted to deploy the anchor but failed due to a lack of electrical power.


Damage to Vessel



Breach in the starboard hull



Starboard hull



Damaged propeller



MV Calypso Highfield tender

Post-occurrence examination of the vessel's hull identified extensive impact and abrasion damage consistent with contact with a hard seabed or rocky shoreline. Large areas of the antifouling coating were scraped away, with deep scoring extending along the hull bottom. At least two areas of the hull were breached, including a substantial longitudinal rupture where the composite laminate had been torn open and peeled away, leaving fractured fibres and internal construction material exposed. A separate puncture and surrounding laminate damage were also visible. Both propellers showed apparent impact damage and deformation.

Other Safety Issues

Manning requirements

VIRGIN ISLANDS SHIPPING REGISTRY

SMALL COMMERCIAL VESSEL CERTIFICATE

Issued under the provisions of
the Code of Practice for the Safety of Small Commercial Vessels

Under the authority of the **Government of the Virgin Islands**

Certifying code; Maritime Coastguard Agency MGN 280 "Yellow Code"

Name of the ship	*Distinctive / Official Number*	*Callsign*	*Type of ship*
CALYPSO	**1317864**	**ZJL2588**	**Small Commercial Vessel Motor**
Propulsion (KW)	*Port of Registry*	*Gross tonnage*	*Maximum no. of persons*
	[redacted]	**41**	12
Length overall	*Length load line*	*Place & date of build*	*Description*
13.41		**Algrefeuille France / 2021**	**TWIN SCREW**
Name and address of owner		*Operator / Manager / Agent*	
[redacted]		**VIRGIN CHARTER YACHTS, NANNY CAY , Virgin Islands (British)**	

The ship shall be manned by following personnel

SCV crew requirement

MASTER	**BML GRADE 2**	*DECK RATINGS*	**ONE (1)**

**** Vessel shall carry at least one person holding a Radio Operator's Certificate and this person may be the Master or any member of the crew.**

This is to certify that the above named vessel was examined by Virgin Islands Shipping Registry at [redacted] BVI on [redacted] and found to be in accordance with the requirements of the Code of Practice for the Construction, Machinery, Equipment, Stability and Examination of Motor Vessels, of up to 24 metres Load Line length, in commercial use and which does not carry cargo or more than twelve (12) passengers, published by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) of the Department for Transport (DfT), United Kingdom.

This certificate will remain v[redacted] subject to the vessel, its machinery and equipment being efficiently maintained, annual examinations and manning complying with the Code of Practice, and to the following conditions: (1) BVI WATERS ONLY. (2) WHEN OPERATING ON BARE-BOAT CHARTER/ HIRE AS A PLEASURE VESSEL, THE SAFE MANNING CONDITIONS DO NOT APPLY, SUBJECT TO THE OWNERS COMPLYING WITH MGN 280(M) ANNEX 8.) (3) THE OUT OF WATER INSPECTION IS TO BE CARRIED OUT AT THE 3RD ANNUAL INSPECTION.

SCV manning exemption

Details of examinations are recorded in Form; SCV 2.

The permitted area of operation is **Category 4** up to 20 miles from a safe haven, in daylight and favorable weather.

Issued by the **Government of the Virgin Islands** at **Road Harbour** [redacted] This document expires on [redacted] and is subject to Annual Inspection.

Annual inspections		
Date	*Place*	*Signature*
[redacted]		

John Samuel (Director)

Virgin Islands Shipping & Maritime Authority FSS-30-284

Revision 1 [redacted]SCVC-231538

Page 1 of 2

MV Calypso's Small Commercial Vessel Certificate specified a minimum complement comprising a master holding a BML Grade 2 qualification and one additional deck rating. It also required at least one crew member to hold a Radio Operator's Certificate, which could be held by either the master or the deck rating. At the time of the occurrence, only the captain and five guests were reported to be on board, and no additional person had been assigned as the required deck rating.

Although the certificate exempts bareboat-charter operations from its specified safe-manning conditions, Calypso was operating as a skippered charter at the time of the incident. Therefore, the bareboat-charter exemption did not apply, and the vessel's certificate safe-manning requirements remained in effect.

MGN 280 Code

The Virgin Islands Shipping and Maritime Authority certified MV Calypso under MGN 280 and the applicable Code of Practice for Small Commercial Motor Vessels, commonly referred to as the Yellow Code. The Code requires commercial vessels to be operated safely and manned by suitably qualified and experienced personnel. Although the United Kingdom subsequently introduced the Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code, the Virgin Islands Shipping and Maritime Authority confirmed that the Yellow Code remained applicable for small commercial vessels up to 24 meters.

Bareboat Charter Manning Exemption

Under MGN 280 Yellow Code, section 26.3.1, a vessel hired on a bareboat basis and used solely as a pleasure vessel is not subject to the safe-manning conditions in Annex 3. This exemption recognises that a genuine recreational bareboat charter is operated privately for leisure rather than as a commercial service requiring certificated professional crew. However, the exemption relates specifically to the Annex 3 manning requirements; it does not remove the obligation to operate the vessel safely. Under section 26.3.2, the owner or managing agent must provide the charterer with sufficient information about the vessel and its equipment and must be satisfied that the proposed skipper and crew are competent for the intended voyage.

Commercial Use of a Bareboat Charter

Section 26.3.3 of MGN 280 (Yellow Code) provides that where a bareboat vessel is used for further commercial work, Annex 3 manning requirements apply. The bareboat exemption therefore applies only to vessels used privately for pleasure. Where the vessel is used to carry paying passengers or provide another commercial service, the applicable skipper and additional crew requirements must be met. The vessel's actual use, rather than how the charter agreement is described, determines the manning requirements.

Regarding MV Calypso, the guests did not hire the captain or have full operational control of MV Calypso. VCY hired and assigned the captain, although its documents placed responsibility for him with the charterer. The captain's and guests' accounts did not support this arrangement. Based on the evidence obtained, the charter was not considered a genuine bareboat charter.

Analysis

Aim

The purpose of the analysis is to assess the accident's contributing factors and circumstances and use them to make recommendations to prevent similar accidents in the future.

Overview

The investigation concluded that MV Calypso grounded on Great Camanoe after losing propulsion while underway from Trellis Bay to Scrub Island. During the ensuing 18-minute drift, the captain focused primarily on restoring propulsion as the vessel continued toward the rocky shoreline. The powered windlass was unavailable after electrical power was lost, and the anchor was not deployed manually. No effective means of stopping the drift was established before the vessel grounded. The five guests were transferred to safety, and no injuries were reported. This section examines the factors that contributed to the grounding and the effectiveness of the onboard response, including emergency preparedness, anchoring, communications, crewing, workload, and passenger management.

Reported Loss of Engine Power and Propulsion

The port engine had trouble starting on 28th and 29th June. On both occasions, VCY's remote troubleshooting instructions enabled the engine to start, after which it reportedly operated normally. VCY provided the same instructions on both dates. On 30th June, the captain reported a loss of engine power and propulsion while the vessel was underway.

The EVC e-Key system requires a specific sequence to start the engines. First, it must receive battery power and be unlocked using the registered key fob. The ignition must then be activated before the start buttons are pressed. If the sequence is incomplete, the EVC system may remain locked, preventing one or both engines from starting even when normal battery voltage is displayed. This could explain the earlier starting difficulties, but it does not explain why engine power was suddenly lost after the engines were operating underway.

On 30th June, both engines reportedly started normally and idled for approximately 10 minutes before departure. However, the vessel later reported losing engine power and propulsion while underway. Accounts obtained during the investigation were inconsistent as to whether the loss affected only the port engine or both engines before the grounding. The evidence did not establish that usable propulsion or manoeuvring control was restored before grounding. Post-grounding diagnostic information was insufficient to identify the nature or source of the fault. Consequently, the investigation could not determine the technical cause of the loss of propulsion.

Human Factors and Situational Awareness

Throughout the charter, the captain was responsible for the safe operation of MV Calypso and the five guests aboard, including assessing departure readiness, keeping a navigational watch, briefing guests on safety procedures, and coordinating emergency responses.

The vessel operated without the second crew member required by its Small Commercial Vessel Certificate. After the reported loss of propulsion, the captain had to troubleshoot the machinery, control the vessel's drift, prepare and deploy an anchor, make emergency calls, and protect the guests, including young children.

Focused on restoring propulsion as the vessel drifted toward shore, the captain did not deploy an anchor or make a VHF urgency or distress call before grounding. Guests alerted him to the approaching rocks and suggested anchoring. As the situation developed, they donned lifejackets and took steps to protect themselves and the children.

While the absence of the required second crew member did not remove the captain's responsibilities, it created a single-operator workload during a rapidly developing, high-stress emergency. This led to workload saturation and limited the captain's ability to maintain situational awareness, troubleshoot the propulsion system, arrest the vessel's drift, communicate the emergency, and coordinate passenger safety at the same time. A second crew member could have supported the response by maintaining a lookout, preparing the anchor, making emergency communications, and assisting the guests while the captain retained command and addressed the loss of propulsion.

Anchoring

After losing propulsion, the captain went directly to the engine room to restore engine power. When those attempts failed, no effective alternative was used to slow or arrest the vessel's drift. MV Calypso was equipped with a primary anchor and a winch handle for manual operation. A secondary anchor, rigged with rope and chain, was stored in a deck locker immediately adjacent to the primary anchor.

Early deployment of either anchor could have slowed or even arrested the vessel's movement toward the shoreline. Although the reported loss of electrical power prevented the powered windlass from operating, manual deployment remained an option, subject to the vessel's position, water depth, seabed conditions, and the operability of the anchoring arrangement. Neither anchor was deployed, and the vessel continued drifting until it grounded.

Post Grounding Response

After the grounding, the captain initially focused on freeing MV Calypso from the rocks. The investigation found no evidence that he assessed the vessel's watertight integrity, stability, or risk of further movement before attempting to remove it. The investigation also found no evidence that he assessed whether it was safe for the

guests to remain aboard, whether they should be transferred to safety, or whether refloating should be deferred until professional assistance arrived.

The captain asked an adult guest to help launch the vessel's Highfield tender, then used it to try to pull the 16.3-tonne MV Calypso off the rocks. When this proved unsuccessful, the captain sought help from passing boaters. They secured lines between their vessels and MV Calypso and made several further attempts to free it. Throughout these efforts, the five guests, including three children, remained in the aft cockpit, exposed to hazards from tensioned lines, unexpected vessel movement, continued contact with the rocky shoreline, and uncertainty about the condition of the damaged hull. At some point, the tender capsised near the vessel's stern. Its loss reduced the immediate options for transferring the guests to safety.

Technical Support

VCY provided remote technical support during the charter, restoring engine operation on 28th and 29th June. However, this support did not establish a technical diagnosis or confirm whether an underlying condition required resolution. When the port engine's starting difficulty recurred, no in-person inspection was conducted before the vessel departed on 30th June. As a result, the vessel continued the charter without an onboard technical assessment to determine or document the cause of the recurring starting difficulty.

Following the grounding, VCY technicians assessed the port engine's starting issue as a recurring e-Key authorisation problem caused by an incomplete starting sequence. This was VCY's technical assessment. Although this was the only recurring engine-related difficulty reported during the charter, its recurrence could have prompted a documented operational risk assessment to determine whether an onboard technical inspection was necessary before the vessel's next departure.

Conclusion

Safety issues directly contributing.

1. The vessel experienced a reported loss of propulsion for a technical reason that could not be determined.
2. The vessel's drift was not arrested before it reached the shoreline.
3. The powered windlass did not operate, and neither the primary nor secondary anchor was deployed manually.

Safety issues not directly contributing.

1. Recurring port-engine starting difficulties were managed remotely without an onboard technical assessment; no causal connection with the later loss of propulsion was established.
2. No VHF urgency or distress call was transmitted before the grounding.
3. Refloating attempts began without evidence of a structured assessment of hull integrity, stability, further movement, or the safety of keeping the guests aboard.
4. Operating without the required second crew member created a high single-operator workload that limited the capacity available for drift monitoring, anchoring, communications, and passenger management.

Recommendations

To: Virgin Islands Shipping and Maritime Authority

1. MSIRA recommends that the Virgin Islands Shipping and Maritime Authority review and, where necessary, strengthen its arrangements for maintaining the professional competence of Boatmaster Grade 2 licence holders by establishing a proportionate, occurrence-based process to determine whether a marine incident identifies a need for further competency support. Where appropriate, such support may include targeted refresher training, practical assessment, or other suitable measures that address emergency response, emergency anchoring, VHF communications, passenger management, and dynamic risk assessment.

To: Virgin Charter Yachts

1. Establish a documented crewing and departure-control process to ensure that every commercial charter is manned in accordance with the vessel's Small Commercial Vessel Certificate. The process should also ensure that assigned captains and crew complete vessel-specific familiarisation and practical emergency drills, including manual anchor deployment, VHF urgency and distress communications, grounding response and passenger management.

2. Review and strengthen defect-management and return-to-service procedures to ensure that recurring engine, propulsion, or electrical difficulties are formally recorded and subjected to a documented operational risk assessment. If the cause remains unresolved, a competent technician should examine the vessel before it resumes commercial operation. The vessel should not return to service until the technician has assessed the defect and formally documented its operational status.

Safety recommendations must never imply blame or liability.